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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ect of nancial education on foreign portfolio investment. We
show that higher investor nancial education fosters international diversication, and that its
role is particularly pronounced where information problems and monitoring costs are likely to
be more severe, that is, in countries where protection of minority shareholdersrights is weaker.
We interpret this evidence as supportive of the conjecture that nancial education lessens
the informational constraints binding foreign investors.
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1 Introduction
The need to provide adequate protection for investors in nancial markets, has given birth to a lively
debate on which is the more appropriate remedy: regulation of nancial products and institutions
versus investors nancial education.
Recent literature has highlighted a signicant impact of nancial literacy on economic behavior
(Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Guiso and Jappelli (2009); van Rooij et al. (2011); van Rooij et al.
(2012)). However, the evidence is much more controversial when turning to evaluation of policies
aimed to improve investorsnancial knowledge. A recent strand of literature questions the e¤ec-
tiveness of nancial education programs (Hathaway and Khatiwada (2008); Willis (2009); Gale and
Levine (2010)) and claims the superiority of regulation remedies (Willis (2008); Willis (2011)).
This work aims to contribute to the debate bringing to light the joint contribution of these fac-
tors in explaining one of the major anomaly in investors optimizing behavior, that is, international
portfolio under-diversication. The benets from international diversication of equity portfolios
have been documented long ago (Markowitz (1952); Sharpe (1964); Grubel (1968); Levy and Sarnat
(1970); Solnik (1974)) and persist despite increased stock market integration and systemic crises
(Santis and Gerard (1997); Das and Uppal (2004)). However, investors actually hold a dispropor-
tionately small amount of foreign equities. The evidence of lack of diversication, often referred
to as "home equity bias", is documented by many authors (French and Poterba (1991); Tesar and
Werner (1995), among others). The availability of data on bilateral-specic foreign portfolio holdings
has partially shifted the attention on the composition of the foreign portfolio, and spurred a rich
empirical literature investigating the patterns and determinants of international portfolio allocation
(Chan et al. (2005); Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2014)).
However, while the literature on the role played by nancial regulation to explain foreign invest-
ment is vast, the literature investigating the e¤ects of nancial education on foreign investment is
rather scarce.
We provide evidence that nancial education fosters foreign investment and, more interestingly,
that its role appears particularly pronounced where information problems and monitoring costs are
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likely to be more severe, that is, in countries with weaker protection of minority shareholdersrights.
Since information asymmetries between foreign and local investors are particularly severe with respect
to the evaluation of a rms governance structure (Leuz et al. (2009); Kho et al. (2009)), these ndings
can be interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis that nancial education contributes to international
portfolio investment by loosening the informational constraints binding foreign investors.
Poor investor protection exacerbates the information barriers faced by foreign investors, thus
deterring inward investment. These barriers can be particularly relevant for less educated investors,
that indeed appear to discard investment in less protective economies.
To the extent that nancial education permits easier access to foreign rmsinformation, highly
educated investors might be more willing to diversify their international portfolio in countries a¤ord-
ing lower minority shareholder protection. Investors endowed with a lower nancial literacy would
instead avoid less protective countries which demand excessively high information costs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 reviews previous contributions on
nancial education and investor protection related to international portfolio diversication issues.
Section 3 illustrates the empirical setting, while Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 reports the
main descriptive statistics, and Section 6 shows the results of our empirical analysis. Section 7
reports further empirical evidence and widely discusses the results. Section 8 summarizes the main
ndings and concludes.
2 Literature and contribution
2.1 Financial education
The literature has shown that an improved knowledge of notions and products is related to more
virtuous nancial behavior, such as planning and saving for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell (2007);
van Rooij et al. (2012)), stock market participation (van Rooij et al. (2011)), and portfolio diversi-
cation (Guiso and Jappelli (2009); Kimball and Shumway (2010)). Existing contributions on the
linkage between nancial literacy and portfolio diversication, relying almost exclusively on survey-
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based information, generally fail in providing any formal test on the causal linkage between nancial
education and international portfolio diversication. Indeed, the analysis of portfolio diversication
has focused either on the comparison between householdsportfolios and a benchmark e¢ cient port-
folio (von Gaudecker (2015)), or to diversication indexes, based on the fraction invested in mutual
funds and on the number of individual stocks in portfolio (Guiso and Jappelli (2009)). Calvet et al.
(2007) use a dataset with information on the overall wealth of all Swedish resident households to
evaluate the risk properties of household portfolios. The data records not only all asset classes (real
estate, bonds, stocks, funds and bank accounts), but also portfolio holdings at individual asset level.
Notwithstanding the reliable, highly detailed and comprehensive information on the portfolio hold-
ings of the Swedish population, this dataset does not contain information on individual nancial
knowledge. Financial sophistication is proxied by variables such as wealth, income and education,
and results suggest that less sophisticated households tend to hold less diversied portfolios. Though
international portfolio diversication is not the focal issue in Calvet et al. (2007), an indirect linkage
between investor sophistication, and international diversication rests on the evidence that house-
holds with standard predictors of nancial sophistication hold more diversied portfolios of equity
and balanced mutual funds, most of which are internationally diversied.
Kumar and Korniotis (2013) using a demographic-based proxy for smartness,1 show that portfolio
distortions among which preference for local stocksof "smart" investors reect an informational
advantage that generate high risk-adjusted returns, while the distortions of "dumb" investors arise
from psychological biases, as they experience low-risk adjusted performance.
To our knowledge the present paper is the rst one studying the relationship between nancial
literacy and international portfolio diversication. The working paper by Kimball and Shumway
(2010) represents the only exception. This paper exploits a US investorscross-sectional survey in
2005 to create an index of nancial sophistication and correlate it to puzzling investing behaviors,
among which home bias.2 Specically, they study how nancial literacy a¤ects the probability to
1Kumar and Korniotis (2013) cannot rely upon an index of nancial literacy and construct a measure of "smartness"
detecting the demographic characteristics strongly correlated with memory, verbal, and quantitative abilities (age,
education, social network and income).
2Graham et al. (2009) follow a similar perspective studying the e¤ect of self-assessed and objective competence on
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diversify portfolios by investing in global or international funds. The existence of a correlation
between these anomalous behaviors and lack of nancial sophistication make the authors conclude
that the latter generates misunderstanding of how multiple assets combine to yield a portfolios
overall risk and returns.
Our paper contributes to the literature on nancial education by identifying its role in driving
investorsforeign investment pattern. Our analysis is indeed not limited to the assessment of the
correlation between the investors degree of nancial education and the probability of diversifying
abroad, as in Kimball and Shumway (2010). We exploit the multidimensionality of the investment
opportunity set a piece of information often absent in survey-based datasetsto investigate how
foreign portfolio allocation in di¤erent countries depends on the investors level of nancial knowledge.
This study uncovers an interesting empirical nding: highly literate investors tilt their portfolios
towards countries relatively less protective of shareholder rights. This evidence points to a joint
role of nancial education and nancial market regulation -two competing tools advocated by the
literature as potential remedies to behavioral biases and information asymmetries- in explaining
international equity portfolio investment.
2.2 Investor protection legislation
Since domestic sources of outside nance are limited in many countries around the world (Giannetti
and Koskinen (2010)), foreign capital has become increasingly important (Bekaert et al. (2002)).
International nance literature has emphasized the existence of a role of corporate governance in
stimulating external nance by reducing information asymmetry (Leuz et al. (2009); Kho et al.
(2009)).
Foreign investors are more vulnerable to information barriers than domestic investors. Corporate
governance can partially o¤set this lack of information by signalling the quality of the institutions
in terms of rights guaranteed to the investor (La Porta et al. (1998)), and hence can be particularly
inuential on those investors, the foreign ones, more heavily hit by information costs.
trading behavior (trading frequency, home bias). Their results indicate that investors who feel more competent about
investing in foreign assets are more willing to shift a portion of their assets overseas.
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The index of shareholder rights adopted in the paper is the antidirector rights index (ADR),
proposed in the seminal paper by La Porta et al. (1998) (LLSV (1998), henceforth), and measures how
strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders
in the corporate decision making process.3
Standard asset pricing models assuming a representative agent predict that di¤erences in ob-
servable characteristics of the asset, such as investor rights and nancial development of the issuing
rm or country, should be capitalized in share prices, such that investing in any stock will be a fair
investment regardless of the issuers level of investor protection (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). However,
when heterogeneity across investors is accounted for, the equilibrium price discount discloses only
the average behavior thus inducing under- or over-investment by those investors for which the price
discount is, respectively, too low or too high (Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010)).
In particular, as noted by Leuz et al. (2009), this price discount is likely not su¢ cient for investors,
such as foreign ones, that plausibly face information problems beyond those of domestic investors.
Previous work originating from LLSV (1998) underlines how investor protection a¤ects nan-
cial market development, that is, the supply of equity, leaving the demand side mostly unexplored.
This latter perspective becomes relevant insofar as one accounts for heterogeneity across investors.
Recent work has highlighted the asymmetric impact of corporate governance on di¤erent categories
of investors (Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013)). Leuz et al. (2009)
investigate the impact of rm-level corporate governance on foreign holdings, and nd that US in-
vestors invest less in foreign rms with poor outsider protection and opaque earnings. In particular,
they nd that foreign holdings in rms with poor governance are driven by information asymme-
try. Their identication strategy relies on a comparison across countries with di¤erent degrees of
investor protection: a role of rmscorporate governance within each country is present only where
national level institutions are poor. Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) show that investor protection
impacts nancial market development by inuencing the demand for equity, because di¤erent classes
of investors specically, controlling shareholders and outside shareholderscan di¤er in the benets
3As discussed below, we consider alternative measures to shareholder rights: the "revised" antidirector rights index
(Djankov et al. (2008)) and the "Doing Business" Index of Investor Protection Strength (World Bank).
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accruing to them, and therefore in their willingness to pay for stocks. Giofré (2013) highlights how
laws protecting di¤erent interests can asymmetrically a¤ect foreign stakeholders. More specically,
foreign shareholders value strong creditor rights, which potentially mitigate the riskiness of projects,
while bondholders are negatively a¤ected by strong shareholder rights, which might induce rms to
engage in excessively risky behavior.
The above-mentioned evidence emphasizes that the same corporate governance rules unevenly
a¤ect various categories of investors, thus suggesting that their impact may crucially depend on
investorscharacteristics. Among these, we focus on the role of investorsnancial knowledge. Our
work can contribute to the literature on investor protection, by investigating how far heterogeneity in
investor nancial knowledge can a¤ect the sensitivity of cross-border investment to foreign corporate
governance.
3 Estimable equation and testable implications
Our paper aims to assess the role of nancial education on foreign equity portfolios.4
Our background theoretical framework rests on standard equilibrium models (Gehrig (1993);
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994); Chan et al. (2005)) in which investors are supposed to face di¤erent
information costs when investing in various nancial markets, and portfolio holdings are driven by
bilateral investment barrier relative to the average.5
Absent any investor-specic factor, the "unbiased" portfolio holding of an asset depends, as in
standard portfolio choice theory, on asset characteristics (risk and return). When considering equi-
librium asset holdings without investment barriers, all investors ought to hold the same portfolio,
i.e., the value-weighted portfolio, in which each asset is weighted according to its share in world stock
market capitalization. The same portfolio is still universally optimal in equilibrium even in the pres-
4Domestic positions and home bias are therefore not analyzed in the present paper. Domestic shares impact our
analysis only indirectly, since the weight of each foreign stock index in the overall portfolio also depends on the
domestic share.
5Gehrig (1993) develop a variance-ination model, while Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Chan et al. (2005) follow
a return-reducing approach. Though the logic beyond the two approaches is quite di¤erent, they are conducive to the
same testable outcome, that is the object of the our empirical analysis.
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ence of investment barriers, provided that these barriers identically a¤ect all investors. Conversely,
heterogeneity in bilateral-specic investment barriers generates a wedge between the investor-specic
optimal portfolio and the value-weighted portfolio. This wedge depends, in particular, on the dis-
tance between the investment barrier of country l investing in country j and the average barrier
calculated over all countries investing in asset j.
The observed portfolio weight in asset j by investing country l is dened as wlj, whileMSj is the
market share of asset j in the world market capitalization.
The ratio wlj
MSj
is a "scaled portfolio share", and captures the wedge between the actual holding
and the market share: A portfolio share wlj larger than js market share signals that asset j is over-
weighted in country ls portfolio, while a ratio lower than 1 signals that country j is under-weighted.
To estimate the e¤ect of nancial education on foreign portfolio, we run the following standard
linear estimation:6

wlj
MSj

= +
P
n=1;::;N
nXnlj +
P
k=1;::;K
kW kl +
P
h=1;::;H
hZhj + "lj (1)
Our regression specication accounts for pair-specic and country specic factors, which poten-
tially capture investment frictions.
Among pair-specic variables we include N covariates, denoted by Xlj; which are expected to
capture investment barriers. If we consider, for instance, the distance between country l and j as
an indicator of investment cost, we expect a negative sign for the associated coe¢ cient: a higher
"relative proxy" (e.g., greater distance between investing country l and target country j with respect
to average distance) is associated with investor l biasing her portfolio away from country j stocks.
The main variables of interest in this paper are instead country-specic, and are nancial edu-
cation (investing-country specic) and investor protection legislation (destination-country specic).
To understand the mechanisms through which nancial education a¤ects foreign investments, we in-
6We adopt the ratio form, w=MS; rather than the di¤erenced form, w   MS; for the dependent variable and,
consistently, also for the regressors. In so doing, the regression coe¢ cients can be conveniently interpreted and
compared, irrespective of their unit of measure (distance in kilometers, indexes with di¤erent scale, etc.). An alternative
solution could be the use of the logratio, a practice recently criticized for the empirical analysis of home bias (Cooper
et al. (2013)).
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clude an interaction term between investing countrys nancial knowledge and destination countrys
corporate governance.

wlj
MSj

= +
P
n=1;::;N
nXnlj+
P
h=1;::;H 1
hZhj +
P
k=1;::;K 1
kW kl +
HZHj +
KWKl +W
K
l Z
H
j +"lj (2)
In the above specication, W kl represents generically all investor-specic factors except nancial
education, which is labeled by WKl : its coe¢ cient 
K is expected to be positive, because higher
nancial literacy should induce more foreign portfolio investment.
The variable Zhj refer to all destination-country factors, except the investor protection rights
index, which is labeled by ZHj : since corporate governance should help foreign investors reduce the
informational gap with respect to local investors, its coe¢ cient H is expected to be positive.
Finally, the coe¢ cient  of the interaction term WKl Z
H
j can have either sign.
A positive sign would suggest that the two variables of interest are complements: highly literate
investors tilt their portfolio toward countries that better protect minority shareholdersrights. Such
a nding could be interpreted as nancial knowledge spurring international portfolio diversication
by helping the removal of behavioral biases, and ameliorating investorsunderstanding of nancial
market mechanisms. Specically, higher nancial knowledge would encourage foreign diversication
by allowing investors to value the role of shareholders rights embedded in corporate governance
rules.
Conversely, a negative sign would suggest that the two variables of interest are substitutes: highly
literate investors tilt their portfolio toward countries less protective of minority shareholdersrights.
Such a nding might indicate that nancial knowledge contributes to foreign portfolio investment by
loosening the informational constraints of foreign investors. In such a case, indeed, nancial education
would enhance portfolio investment in those economies in which information and monitoring costs
are more pervasive, that is, in those countries featuring weaker investor protection rules.
To estimate the above parameters, we adopt a feasible Generalized Least Squares specication
correcting for both heteroskedasticity and general correlation of observations across destination coun-
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tries, with standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at the investing country and year levels,
as suggested for nance panel data sets (Petersen (2009)). Finally, we follow a GMM approach to
account for possible sources of endogeneity a¤ecting nancial education and investor protection.
4 Data
4.1 Dependent variable
We consider equity portfolio investments by 40 investing countries7 in 41 destination stock markets8,
for the period 20012008.9 We adopt the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), released
by the IMF, a dataset which has been exploited in many recent papers (Fidora et al. (2007); Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Sorensen et al. (2007); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013)).
This survey collects security-level data from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio
investment is broken down by instrument (equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter pro-
viding information on the destination of portfolio investment. While the CPIS provides the most
comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to a number
of important caveats.10 The most important is that the CPIS is unable to address the issue of third-
country holdings and round-tripping, very frequent in the case of nancial o¤shore centers. Moreover,
the survey does not report domestic positions which need to be retrieved from other sources.11
7Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czeck Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,Mexico, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.
8Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. Note that there are some countries
included as investing ones but not as destination ones, and vice versa, because of data availability. See the footnotes
to Table 2 and Table 3, for more details.
9The data period is dictated by data availability for nancial education (1999-2008) and portfolio holdings (2001-
onwards).
10See www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm for more details on the survey.
11See Panel A of Table 1, for details on the construction of the dependent variable.
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4.2 Main regressors: Financial Education and Investor Protection Leg-
islation
From 1999 to 2008, the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) has published an indicator of
nancial education. The indicator is computed from a survey of senior business leaders who represent
a cross-section of the business community in the countries examined, and merged with data drawn
from international organizations. The sample distribution reects a breakdown of industry by sectors
(manufacturing, services and primary), and the sample size is proportional to each countrys GDP.12
The "education in nance" question asks for an evaluation, on a 0-10 scale, of the statement:
"education in nance does meet the needs of the business economy".
The WCY indexes are based on managers and country experts responses, rather than on a
standardized survey of individuals. This can cast doubts on the reliability of these indexes. Recent
contributions by Jappelli (2010) and Jappelli and Padula (2011) show that the ranking of economies in
this survey is largely consistent with the one obtained by SHARE, which provides detailed information
on cognitive abilities at the individual level, for 11 European countries. This evidence increases
condence in the WCY index as reasonable indicator of nancial education.13
The other main variable for the analysis captures the degree of protection of minority shareholders
rights. We adopt the antidirector rights (ADR) index, which measures how strongly the legal system
favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision
making process (LLSV (1998)). For robustness, we check the validity of our ndings also under
alternative specications of the protection rights index.14
12The survey questions are targeted to top and middle managers (about 4,000 overall in 55 countries), nationals or
expatriates, located in local and foreign enterprises in the country in question, who generally have an international
experience and outlook.
13Lo Prete (2013) also exploits the WCY survey, to investigate the linkage between economic literacy, nancial
development, and income inequality.
14For more details on the construction of these indexes and the full set of regressors adopted in the paper, see Table
1.
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5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the regressors included in our analysis.15 The rst three
variables in columns (1)-(3) are investing-country specic variables, and are drawn from the IMD
World Competitiveness Yearbook. It is worth stressing that these variables are time-varying. The
rst variable is the main source-specic variable of interest, that is, investor nancial education,
while "economic literacy" and "nance skills" are adopted as alternatives to nancial education.16
These investing-country specic variables are followed by ve destination-country specic vari-
ables that capture the investor protection a¤orded to minority shareholders in the destination country.
The ADR index represents the principal destination-specic variable. This is mostly used throughout
the paper since largely adopted in the literature. However, for robustness, we test if our results hold
under di¤erent index specications.
The variables in columns (9)-(11) are meant to capture more generally legal protection. Capital
mobility in column (12) is used to proxy nancial frictions in capital trading and is referred to both
source and destination countries. GDP per capita and exchange rate regime are used as source
country specic controls which may inuence foreign portfolio investment and be correlated with
nancial education. Columns (15)-(18), report country-specic variables that capture general country
governance, among which the last two variables are time-varying. Finally, the last column shows the
dummy variable identifying the legal origin common law (1) versus civil law (0)of the destination
country.
It is worth stressing that the absolute magnitude of the variables included does not a¤ect per se
the size of the associated coe¢ cient, since all variables, for consistency with the analytical framework,
enter our regression specication in relative terms, that is scaled by their world average.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (by destination country) and of
nancial education (by investing country). The rst column reports the average portfolio share
15We do not report statistics on gravity variables such as distance, common border, common language, colonial
linkage, common currency and common legal origin.
16The "economic literacy" question asks respondents to evaluate the sentence: "economic literacy among the pop-
ulation is generally high". The "nance skills" question asks respondents to evaluate the sentence: "nance skills are
readily available".
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invested in country j by all investing economies in the period 2001-2008. The second column shows
the corresponding standard deviation. The magnitude of the standard deviation is quite variable
across destination countries, ranging from a value close to the average portfolio share in the United
Kingdom to a value almost 4 times larger than the average portfolio share in Malaysia. We report,
in the third column, the average market share, that is, the respective investable fraction of world
market capitalization if the value weighted portfolio prevailed as optimal portfolio. Dahlquist et al.
(2003) estimate the fraction of shares closely held across 51 countries, nding that on average 32
percent of shares are not available for trading and cannot therefore be held by foreign investors.
This induces a measurement error in the size of domestic and foreign bias that was neglected by
previous literature. Following Dahlquist et al. (2003), we consider the MSCI market share, based on
the free-oat adjusted market capitalization.
We then report the mean of the dependent variable of our empirical analysis, that is the "scaled
foreign portfolio share", computed as the ratio of the average ratio portfolio share to market share.
To provide an economic interpretation of this measure, consider that a scaled foreign share equal
to 1 implies that foreign assets enter portfolios with a weight equal to their stock market share.
The pervasive evidence that the average scaled foreign share is almost always below unity i.e., the
evidence that foreign assets are generally underweighted is the mirror image of the strong home
bias reported in the international nance literature.17
The scaled foreign share ranges from 0.068 for Canada to 2.822 for Ireland. The result for Ireland
stresses the concerns of third-country holdings and round-tripping in the CPIS survey mentioned
above, and point to the need to control for o¤shore nancial centers in our empirical analysis. A
notable degree of heterogeneity in scaled portfolio shares toward various foreign assets emerges:
there might exist destination-specic factors among which are investor protection lawsmaking
some countries more attractive than others to foreign investors, investing-specic factors among
which nancial education, and pair-specic factors inducing di¤ering evaluations of the same asset
by di¤erent investors. This suggests the need to consider both pair-specic and country-specic
17See Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), for an extensive discussion of the implications of minority investor rights on
home equity bias.
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factors as potential determinants of cross-border investment in our empirical analysis.
The last two columns of the table report mean and standard deviation of nancial education, the
main time-varying regressor in our analysis. In Table 2, we reported overall descriptive statistics for
nancial education, and we learnt that the standard deviation of nancial education is about 22% of
the overall mean. In Table 3, we pinpoint the time component of nancial educations variability, by
investing country: it is equal to 8% of the overall mean, about one third of total variability, ranging
from 2% for to Sweden to 17% for South Africa.
6 Results
This paper studies the impact of nancial education on cross-border investment, measured by the
"scaled foreign portfolio share" (wlj=MSj). Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, we simply refer to
"foreign portfolio share" rather than "scaled foreign portfolio share" and drop the adjective "relative"
when referring to regressors, keeping in mind that they are all dened in relative terms (with the
exception of dummy variables).
6.1 Role of nancial education
The rst column of Table 4 reports the regression of foreign portfolio share on nancial education of
the investing country l: The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant.
The descriptive statistics of nancial education in Table 2 and 3 report, respectively, its overall
variability and its time variability. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 we add to nancial literacy,
alternatively, time dummies and investing country dummies, to identify, within a preliminary re-
gression analysis, the explanatory power of both the cross sectional and the time components of
the variables variability. We nd, as expected, that the coe¢ cient of nancial education is only
marginally a¤ected by the inclusion of time dummies, while is severely reduced by the inclusion of
country dummies: the variability of nancial education is predominantly driven by its cross sectional
component, but its time component has a non negligible role.
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To properly seize the impact of nancial education, we set a multivariate regression analysis and
control for standard determinants of foreign portfolio investment.
Many empirical contributions nd that the cultural and geographic proximity of the market has
an important inuence on investor stock holdings and trading (Brennan and Cao (1997); Kang and
Stulz (1997); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan et al. (2005); Portes and Rey (2005)). Column
(4) of Table 4 reports the results from a regression including standard gravity variables such as
distance, common border, common language, and colonial dummies.
The variable distance is measured as the great-circle distance between the capital cities of the
destination and investing countries. The common border (language) dummy takes the value 1 if the
investing and destination country share a common border (language), and 0 otherwise. The rst
two variables, distance and common border, capture the physical distance between investing and
destination country. Since transactions in nancial assets are "weightless", a role for distance can be
found only if it has informational content (Portes and Rey (2005)).
The role of the common language dummy is intuitively interpretable, since foreign languages
make collecting information more di¢ cult. Finally, to capture cultural and/or historical ties, we
check whether countries are tied by colonial heritage.
The dummy common colony variable takes the value 1 if the considered pair of countries shares
a similar colonial history.
These variables play an economically and statistically signicant role in explaining the dependent
variable, with a particularly strong impact of the common border dummy (0.501).
Column (4) of Table 4 also include two covariates capturing pair-specic institutional linkages:
namely, common currency area, and common legal origin.
The European Monetary Union (EMU) dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination
countries are EMU members, and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cient is positive and signicant and its
e¤ect is quite large: EMU membership boosts foreign portfolio share by 0.581 compared to non
member countries. Our ndings are qualitatively consistent with the evidence reported by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Balta and Delgado (2009), who nd, as a result of monetary integration,
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a notable increase in foreign investments in the Euro area by EMU countries.
Finally, sharing the same legal origin might encourage cross-border investment, since there is less
fear of unknown factors (Lane (2006); Guiso et al. (2009)). We include a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if the investing and destination countries share the same legal family (English, French,
German or Scandinavian), and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cient is positive, as expected, though not
statistically di¤erent from zero in this specication.18
Overall, the inclusion of these pair-specic factors only marginally reduces the impact of nancial
education, which remains quite large, and notably adds to the explanatory power of the regression,
pushing the adjusted-R2 to 0.18.19
Institutional barriers to capital mobility can deter investment in foreign countries. In column
(5) of Table 4, we control for inward and outward capital mobility, proxied by an index measuring
the restrictions imposed by di¤erent countries on capital ows, derived from the Economic Freedom
Network (Chan et al. (2005), among others, adopt the same index). This index ranges from zero to 10,
and measures the restrictions countries impose on capital ows, assigning a lower rating to countries
with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions. We nd indeed that higher capital mobility of
the destination country attracts more inward investment, while the e¤ect of capital mobility in the
investing country, though positive as expected, is not precisely estimated.
One may legitimately argue that nancial education miscaptures other features of investing coun-
tries.20 Therefore, we include, beyond capital mobility, additional investing country factors to control
for the e¤ect of other investorsspecicities on foreign investment. In column (5) of Table 4, we con-
trol for GDP per capita and exchange rate regime in the investing country. GDP per capita is a
measure of economic development, potentially highly correlated with nancial education, so that its
omission could severely bias coe¢ cientsestimates: its coe¢ cient is indeed positive and statistically
di¤erent from zero. The exchange-rate regime plays an important role in enabling economies to take
advantage of the increasing openness and depth of international capital market. We adopt the IMF
18The coe¢ cient gains statistical signicance in richer specications.
19Our results are consistent with Vlachos (2004), who shows that cultural and regulatory di¤erences generate a
negative impact on cross-country portfolio holdings.
20Notice that, as specied at the bottom of the table, only column (3) includes investing country dummies.
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Coarse Classication of exchange rate regime, ranging from 1 to 6, where higher values of the index
reect higher exibility in the exchange rate regime (Ilzetzki et al. (2008)). Our ndings suggest no
particular linkage between the exchange rate arrangements and international portfolio investment.
To control for time variability, since the period spanned by our sample (2001-2008) encompasses
the nancial crisis, we considered economically more informative a dummy variable capturing the
crisis period 2007-2008, rather than a generic year dummy. Moreover, the crisis dummy would also
allow us to detect whether the role of nancial education on international portfolio investment has
been dampened or enhanced by the crisis. In column (5) of Table 4, we show that neither the nancial
crisis dummy nor its interaction with nancial literacy deliver statistically signicant coe¢ cients.21
After the inclusion of these controls, the coe¢ cient of the nancial education variable is substan-
tially reduced from 0.437 to 0.200, but remains a statistically and economically signicant factor
explaining foreign portfolio investment.
6.2 Role of investor protection
Our analysis has so far focused on bilateral and investing-country specic factors. The descriptive
statistics reported in Table 3, however, emphasize a great deal of heterogeneity across destination
countries, and suggest the need to consider destination specic factors to explain foreign portfolio
positions. In particular, corporate governance can be particularly inuential on investors more af-
fected by information costs, namely foreign investors, by signaling the quality of institutions in terms
of guaranteed investor rights (LLSV (1998)).
The literature has highlighted the e¤ect of corporate governance on foreign investment (Kho et al.
(2009); Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2014)).
The various indexes of shareholder rights adopted in this paper are related to the antidirector
rights (ADR) index, which was originally developed by LLSV to measure how strongly a legal system
favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders, in the corporate decision
21We include a dummy crisis which is equal to 1 in the period 2007 and 2008 and 0 otherwise, since portfolio holdings
in the CPIS refer to year-end and should already account for the beginning of the crisis in 2007. For robustness checks,
we restricted the crisis period to year 2008 only, and results are una¤ected.
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making process.
Column (6) of Table 4, includes the ADR index of destination country j. If all investors, foreign
and domestic, equally weighed ADRj, this factor should be captured by the equilibrium market
share. A non null coe¢ cient of ADR thereby reveals a signicant role of investor protection laws in
explaining the distance between the foreign portfolio position and what is predicted by market share.
The positive and signicant coe¢ cient of ADRj is qualitatively consistent with recent evidence (Kho
et al. (2009); Leuz et al. (2009); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Thapa and Poshakwale (2011)).
Beyond corporate governance mechanisms, there are other regulatory barriers to information
acquisition by foreign investors. Barth et al. (1999) highlight that foreign investors incur costs
in understanding other countries accounting principles. Bae et al. (2008) propose a measure of
country-pair di¤erences in 21 accounting rules based on an international survey of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), in 2001. This measure does not attempt to assess the quality of any
given set of accounting rules, but the extent to which accounting standards di¤er between two
countries. Bae et al. (2008) suggest that analysts tend to avoid following foreign rms adopting
accounting rules that are signicantly di¤erent from the accounting rules used in their home country,
because they incur costs to gain expertise in understanding other countriesGAAP. If this is the
case, the "distance" in accounting standards between two countries should decrease bilateral foreign
investments. We construct the measure of bilateral distance in GAAP and test its impact on foreign
equity portfolio investment. We show in column (7) of Table 4 that more distant accounting principles
do not signicantly deter bilateral investment.
In addition to distance and GDP per capita of the investing country, we also include the GDP
per capita of destination countries, in order to account also for the "mass" of the host economy,
as dictated by standard gravity models. The strong positive coe¢ cient of the destination countrys
GDP per capita variable conrms the strong explanatory power of gravity models also in nancial
markets.
Being ADRj the only destination countrys variable included in the regression, it captures all
18
(time-invariant) destination-country specic factors.22 To pinpoint the role of corporate governance,
in column (8) of Table 4 we add other destination-specic institutional factors which may be corre-
lated with ADRj.
Previous literature has documented that fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable con-
tracts, legal and regulation complexity can signicantly a¤ect portfolio investment (Gelos and Wei
(2005); Leuz et al. (2009)). We include an institutional variable more generally related to country
level governance, that is, "control of the risk of expropriation", that seizes government stance toward
business.
A solid system of legal enforcement could substitute for weak "law on the books": active and
well functioning courts can serve as recourse for investors aggrieved by management (LLSV (1998)).
We therefore also control for the role of the e¢ ciency of the judicial system in attracting foreign
investments. Overall, the introduction of these control factors increases the impact of ADRj from
0.016 to 0.040, and only moderately dampens the impact of nancial education.
In column (8a) and (8b) of Table 4, we check the validity of these ndings when alternative
indicators of investor protection are adopted. In column (8a), the ADR index (LLSV (1998)) is
replaced by its revised version (Djankov et al. (2008)). In column (8b), we adopt, instead, the
strength of investor protection rights index released by the World bank (Doing Business).23
In both specications, we nd a positive impact of nancial education and a positive coe¢ cient
of the variable capturing investor protection.
6.3 Interaction between nancial education and investor protection
The multidimensionality of our investment opportunity set can help understand the mechanisms
through which nancial education a¤ects foreign portfolio holdings. The analysis that follows is aimed
to discriminate between an information-based, and a more general behavioral-based explanation of
the impact of nancial education. This objective is fullled in our setting through the study of
22The regression specications implemented so far also include the degree of capital mobility in the destination
country, but this is a time-varying factor.
23Note that the World Bank index is a time-varying variable. However, it displays an almost negligible variability
for the countries included in our sample.
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the interaction between investing countrys nancial literacy and destination countrys regulatory
strength.
A positive sign of the interaction term would point to a complementarity relationship between
nancial education and investor protection in enhancing foreign investments: highly literate investors
tilt their portfolio toward countries that better protect minority shareholdersrights. In such a case,
higher nancial education can be interpreted as helping individuals to better understand diversica-
tion benets and functioning of markets, so as to induce higher responsiveness to investor protection
rules. Georgarakos and Inderst (2011), dealing with another puzzling behavior in international -
nance, i.e., the lack of stock market participation, underline a complementarity relation between
perception of legal protection in the market and investors perceived capability. They nd that trust
in nancial advice matters only when perceived own capability is low, whereas for households with
higher nancial capability, only the perception of legal protection in nancial markets matters for
stock market participation. This lends support to the behavioral stance, spoused at large by the
nancial literacy literature, that relates lack of nancial knowledge to investorsmisunderstanding
of benets and marketsfunctioning.
Conversely, a negative sign would point to a substitutability relation between nancial education
and investor protection in their impact on foreign investment: highly literate investors tilt their
portfolio toward countries that are less protective of minority shareholdersrights. In such a case,
higher nancial education can be interpreted as helping to alleviate information asymmetry aggriev-
ing foreign investors, thus making relatively less costly the access to rmsnancial information even
in economies featuring weaker protection of minority investors rights.
In column (1) of Table 5, we add to the full regression specication adopted in column (8) of Table
4, an interaction term between nancial education and ADRj. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term
is negative (-0.123) and strongly signicant: investing countries characterized by a higher education
in nance appear to tilt their portfolio toward countries less protective of minority shareholders
rights. This nding represents the main innovative nding of the present paper and will undergo
several tests to prove its validity.
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The way to measure nancial literacy is still debated. Indeed, research often fails to distinguish
nancial literacy from related concepts, such as numeracy. To the extent that nancial literacy
involves skills, rather than just knowledge, these skills likely depend on the ability to work with
numbers. However, numeracy applies much more broadly than to just nancial matters and is more
closely aligned to cognitive abilities (Hung et al. (2009)). Dening and appropriately measuring
nancial literacy is essential to understand the extent of the educational impact as well as barriers
to e¤ective nancial choices. Huston (2010) reviews the broad range of nancial literacy measures
used in research over the last decade, and highlights the existence of severe current limitations.
Consistency of results applying alternative measures of knowledge or skill is also quite controver-
sial. On the one hand, Ardle et al. (2009) and Delawande et al. (2008) show that more numerate
individuals are more adept at complex decision making, including nancial decisions. On the other
hand, von Gaudecker (2015) nds that while low numeracy skills are associated with losses from
under-diversication, nancial knowledge does not seem to have an e¤ect.
Since the type of knowledge matters, we check whether our results are specically related to
nancial knowledge.
In column (2) of Table 5, we adopt, as an alternative to the variable "education in nance", the
variable "economic literacy". When estimating the impact of economic literacy on foreign portfolio
investment, we nd that its direct impact is no longer statistically signicant and its interaction
term with ADRj, though statistically signicant, delivers a much smaller coe¢ cient. This suggests
that the peculiar content of nance in the measure of knowledge adopted matters. To corroborate
this conjecture, we adopt another variable drawn from the same dataset, related to "nance skills",
though not directly referred to education. The regression analysis (column (3)) shows a signicant
positive impact on foreign investment and a signicant negative coe¢ cient of this variable interacted
with ADRj; with a coe¢ cient size more comparable to the nancial educations one.
Finally, a key issue when dealing with the choice of proxies for nancial literacy is the problem
of measurement error. We account for the possibility of some form of measurement error in the
construction of the three variables drawn from the IMD survey ("education in nance", "economic
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literacy", and "nance skills"). Two alternative versions of these three indexes are considered: a
binary variable, splitting investors into those above and those below median (columns (#b), Table 5),
and an ordinal variable taking values 1 to 4 according to the quartile the investors belong to (columns
(#c), Table 5). Results are qualitatively una¤ected by these alternative variable specications.
6.4 Robustness
In previous econometric specications, we controlled for (time-invariant) institutional factors spe-
cic of the destination economy to dispel the legitimate doubt that the (time-invariant) index of
investor protection rights miscaptured other characteristics of the destination economy. Here, we
replace these institutional variables with two time-varying alternative variables, drawn from World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank): "political stability" and "control of corruption".
In column (1) of Table 6, we report results from this specication: compared with the benchmark
regression reported in column (1) of Table 5, the coe¢ cients of finlitl, ADRj index, and their
interaction term are only modestly a¤ected.
In column (2) of Table 6, we add to the standard set of controls for the investing country l,
also the full bunch of control variable used for the destination country, including the ADR of the
investing country, as suggested by Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and Giofré (2014). Qualitative
results persist, suggesting that they are not driven by omitted controls for the investing country.
In column (3) of Table 6, we generally test the impact on foreign portfolio share of the signed
di¤erence between destination-specic and source-specic variables. We therefore consider the dif-
ference between ADRj and ADRl and their interaction with finlitl, controlling for country-pair
di¤erences in all other regressors. We nd no signicant e¤ect of the di¤erence (ADRj  ADRl) on
our dependent variable.
In a recent paper, Cooper et al. (2013) critically discuss the measure of home bias currently
adopted in the empirical literature. They also question the adoption of use of the ratio wll=MSl
as a measure of home bias in country l because it would lead to counterintuitive results which are
strongly dependent on the relative market share of the investing country. A country with a small
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market share, such as Sweden, could display a high home bias measure even investing a relatively
modest fraction of its portfolio in domestic assets, while in a country such as the US, the home bias
measure would be mechanically scaled down by a larger stock market share. This criticism does
not directly apply to our analysis because we deal uniquely with foreign portfolio investment. The
investment of Swedish and US investors in France is scaled by the market share of the destination
country (France), irrespective of the domestic (US or Swedish) market shares.
However, the point raised by Cooper et al. (2013) could be of interest for our analysis to the extent
that destination countries with larger market share might display a systematically lower w=MS ratio
due to a larger denominator. While the inclusion of destination specic controls is also meant to
address this issue, it is however worth checking the sensitivity of our ndings to an alternative
specication of the bias measure. We adopt the bias measure proposed by Cooper et al. (2013)
because considered comparably preferrable in terms of the "desirable features of a bias gure".24 In
column (4) of Table 6, we report the ndings relative to the modied dependent variable: while the
direct e¤ect of nancial education and investor protection are not precisely estimated, the coe¢ cient
of the interaction term is still negative and statistically signicant, in line with previous results.25
In columns (5) to (7) of Table 6 we investigate the role of the nancial crisis. The time period we
are considering may be non-neutral for the analysis, since it encompasses the initial phase of the global
nancial crisis. We check if this event had a direct impact on international diversication incentives
and, more importantly, if it a¤ected the way international portfolios respond to nancial education
and investor protection legislation. In column (5), we test if the nancial crisis a¤ected international
portfolio investment passing through the level of nancial education of the investing country, but
we do not nd such an evidence. In column (6), we test if the nancial crisis a¤ected foreign
portfolio investment passing through investor protection legislation in the destination country. The
24The bias measure proposed by Cooper et al. (2013) ((2.12), p. 35) is the following: HB8;i;j = 2[1 + e pi;j ] 1   1
with pi;j := (wi;j  MSj)=
p
MSj(1 MSj): Since domestic holdings are taken as given and not analyzed in our
empirical analysis, we adopt the above measure after scaling w and MS to the foreign -rather than to the overall-
portfolio. This ensures consistency with the distributional hypotheses lying behind this measure (see Cooper et al.
(2013), Section 2.3, for further details).
25The size of the coe¢ cients is hardly comparable with the previous columns because the regressors are dened in
ratio forms while the dependent variable of column (4) is transformation of a bias measure dened in di¤erence rather
than in ratio terms.
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interaction term turns out to be positive: during the peak of the crisis, investors, probably su¤ering
higher uncertainty, show to allocate a relatively higher portfolio share to countries a¤ording stronger
investor protection. Finally, column (7) shows that the coe¢ cient of the interaction finlitl  ADRj
is still negative and statistically signicant (-0.136) during the crisis period but the substitutability
e¤ect between nancial education and investor protection decreases: the total coe¢ cient in fact
drops, in absolute value, as the dummy for the crisis period increases the coe¢ cient of the interaction
finlitl  ADRj by 0.043. A possible interpretation of this result is that. in crisis periods, when the
uncertainty increases, the role of nancial education as a means to alleviate information asymmetry
may shrink, thus weakening the informational channel. Of course, these preliminary ndings cannot
exhaust the investigation of the e¤ect of the crisis on international diversication: such an analysis
would require a whole picture of the crisis while here we restrict to the initial phase onlyand would
necessitate a rigorous investigation of the evolution of the crisis, and its forms of contagion across
countries.
Finally, we test the robustness of our ndings to the sample specication. In column (8) we
exclude o¤shore nancial centres, which might have the e¤ect of distorting investorsdecisions for
reasons beyond the scope of this work. We exclude Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and
the United Kingdom.26 In column (9), we restrict the sample to OECD countries only. Results do
not highlight any peculiarity induced by the di¤erent sub-samples, and our main ndings remain
qualitatively unaltered.
The evidence of a negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term between finlitl and ADRj delivers
support to the conjecture that education in nance a¤ects international portfolio diversication by
dampening information costs faced by investors who want to invest in those economies featuring
weak standards of investor protection.
Overall, these results can be interpreted as supportive of the information motives to explain
puzzling economic behaviors. A similar interpretative approach can be found in Leuz et al. (2009)
and Christelis et al. (2010). Leuz et al. (2009) investigate the impact of rm-level corporate gover-
26Note that Luxemburg is out of our sample, because data on its ADRj index are unavailable.
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nance on foreign holdings and nd that foreign holdings in rms with poor governance are driven
by information asymmetry. Their identication strategy relies on comparison across countries with
di¤erent degree of investor protection: the role of rmscorporate governance within each country is
present only where national level institutions are poor. Christelis et al. (2010) highlight that cognitive
abilities are more important in explaining participation in nancial markets characterized by more
information-intensive assets (stocks versus bonds). The authors interpret these ndings as conrming
that the association between nancial education and portfolio choice is driven by information con-
straints rather than by preferences or psychological traits. Likewise, our ndings about the inuence
of nancial education on international portfolio diversication point to an informationally-driven
explanation, rather than to a behavioral one.
6.5 Endogeneity issues
Our ndings are potentially awed by endogeneity issues. The literature on nancial literacy has
widely recognized the di¢ culty in assessing a causal, rather than a correlation link, between nancial
literacy and economic or nancial outcomes, such as wealth, stock market participation, pension funds
participation, and portfolio diversication. Existing works are often based on cross-sectional surveys
thus making hard the identication of which variable is the driver and which is the outcome.
In our case, for instance, the outcome of nancial literacy, that is the scaled foreign portfolio
investment, could represent a means to acquire nancial literacy: more familiarity with foreign
investment may create indeed higher incentives to accumulate nancial knowledge. To address this
issue, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset to instrument current nancial literacy with its
lagged values, so as to ensure that the direction of causality goes from education to stock market
investment and not vice versa.
To be a good candidate as an instrument, a variable must possess two properties: it must be
highly correlated with the endogenous variable, and uncorrelated with the error term. While the
rst condition can be satised with a lagged value of nancial literacy, the second condition is not so
obviously fullled. The nancial education variable drawn from the IMD survey, as specied above, is
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subject to a number of caveats, and to the presence of measurement error. If this measurement error
is related to some characteristics of the country in which the survey is conducted, then the same
source of measurement error can arise in the reporting of portfolio holdings for the CPIS survey,
data that are used to construct our dependent variable. In this case, the risk of correlation of the
(lagged) nancial education variable with the error term through the measurement error, is quite
high. To circumvent this problem, we adopt the ordinal denition of nancial literacy, that is likely
less a¤ected by measurement error.
Another possible source of endogeneity comes from the investor protection variable. Indeed, since
the seminal paper by LLSV (1998), the literature has raised a severe endogeneity critique against
the identication of a causal link between investor protection and nancial market development. In
LLSV (1998) the direction of causality between investor protection laws and development of nancial
markets (aggregate asset supply) is quite controversial. Our dependent variable is, instead, related
to the demand side, being the ratio between portfolio weight and market share: the direction of
causality, if any, should therefore go from investor protection to portfolio investment rather than vice
versa. However, we account for this latter source of endogeneity drawing on the large literature on
the legal and institutional origin of investor protection, and adopt, as an instrument, the legal origin
common law versus civil lawof the destination country.27 Indeed, if nancial development can
inuence investor protection it is unlikely it had a role in determining countrieslegal origin, dating
back to a period where nancial markets were undeveloped.
In Table 7, we report results taking into account endogeneity problems through a GMM estima-
tion.28 In column (1) we instrument (ordinal) nancial literacy with its lagged value.29 In column
(2) of Table 7, we instrument investor protection with a dummy variable identifying the common
law versus civil law legal origin of the destination country. Column (3) displays results when both
sources of endogeneity are corrected. All coe¢ cients are larger, compared to the FGLS regressions,
27Note that this destination-country specic instrument is di¤erent from the pair-specic variable "equal legal origin
dummy", included as a standard control in the analysis.
28We implement a GMM regression, robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.
29The di¤ering number of observations across columns is due to countries displaying missing values for nancial
education before 2001, thus preventing the GMM procedure with lagged values.
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and the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients is maintained once endogeneity issues are accounted
for.
In columns (1) to (3) of Table 7, the system of equations is exactly identied. To properly test
the exogeneity of the adopted instruments, we need an overidentied system. The panel dimension of
the nancial literacy variable allows us to have more than one lagged-value to be used as instruments
for the endogenous nancial literacy, so that we can perform a test of overidentifying restrictions to
check the instrumentsvalidity. In column (4) of Table 8, we report results of the regression adopting
three instrumental variables (common law dummy of the destination country; 1 year-lagged nancial
education; 2 year-lagged nancial education) for two endogenous variables (ADRj and nancial
education). The coe¢ cients obtained are statistically signicant and in line with previous results,
and the standard statistics reported at the bottom of column (4), conrm the validity of the included
instruments.30
7 Discussion and further empirical evidence
Our ndings highlight that investors endowed with higher nancial literacy invest relatively more in
foreign countries with lower investor protection.
We interpret this evidence as supportive of the conjecture that nancial education lessens the
informational constraints binding foreign investors. If a mechanism of superior information is at
work it should be detectable for "smart" investors (Kumar and Korniotis (2013)), that is, for those
investing countries ranked in the highest quartiles of the nancial education distribution.
In Table 8, we report results restricted to our variables of interest, i.e., nancial education,
investor protection, and their interactionrelative to the investment made by the highest quartile of
investing countries in terms of nancial education. We denote by rel_finlitljq4 a dummy variable
identifying investors belonging to the fourth highest quartile (q4) of nancial education.31
30The F-test assesses the joint signicance of the chosen instruments in the rst stage regression of the endogenous
regressors on the full set of exogenous variables (including instruments). A high F-test (i.e., a low p-value) reects
a strong correlation between endogenous regressor and instruments. The Hansen J-statistics instead assesses the
exogeneity of the instruments. The p-value of the J-statistics supports the validity of the instruments.
31Notice that the results in Table 8 follow the regression specication adopted in column (1) of Table 5.
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In order to understand how nancial education a¤ects the information access of investors, we
exploit the characteristics of the invested assets. The literature emphasized that information asym-
metries between foreign and local investors are particularly severe with respect to the evaluation of
a rms governance structure (Leuz et al. (2009); Kho et al. (2009)). We therefore split the set of
destination countries by quartiles, according to their di¤erent degrees of investor protection.
We denote by ADRjjQk the variable identifying destination countries belonging to the k   th
quartile of the anti-director right index distribution (Qk).
In Section I of Table 8, we report the coe¢ cient estimates which consider the portfolio investment
of highly literate investors (rel_finlitljq4) in countries featuring a low (Q1), intermediate (Q2&Q3) or
high (Q4) degree of protection of minority shareholder rights. For instance, in column "Q1" of panel
a) of Section I (Table 8), the coe¢ cient of the rel_finlitljq4 variable reveals the following: belonging
to the highest quartile of the distribution of nancial education determines a 0.106 higher foreign
portfolio share; belonging to the lowest quartile of ADRj induces lower foreign portfolio investment
(-0.050). Following a similar interpretation of coe¢ cient estimates, we can draw a full picture of the
investment pattern of investors endowed with a top quartile nancial education.
We are interested in the overall impact of nancial education on foreign investment, that is, its
direct e¤ect (the coe¢ cient of rel_finlitljq4) plus its interaction e¤ect (coe¢ cient of rel_finlitljq4 
rel_ADRjjQk) The interesting regularity of these set of regressions is the following: when consid-
ering measures capturing minority shareholder protection (section I), investors belonging to the top
quartile of the nancial education distribution invest systematically more than others in destination
countries belonging to the rst (Q1), second and third quartile (Q2&Q3), than in destination coun-
tries belonging to the top quartile (Q4) of the investor protection distribution. As far as the rst
quartile is considered, the coe¢ cient of the direct e¤ect is always positive and statistically signi-
cant, while sign and signicance of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is mixed across measures of
investor protection. This shows that highly educated investors invest more in destination countries
in the lowest quartile of the distribution. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term is always positive
and strongly statistically signicant for the intermediate quartiles, and negative and statistically sig-
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nicant for the top quartile: the net overall e¤ect of nancial education is larger in Q2&Q3 countries
than in Q4 countries.
This evidence corroborates the information-based explanation of the role of nancial literacy in
international equity portfolio investment. Investment patterns depend on the balance between costs
and benets. For low nancially literate investors it would be unprotable investing in rms residing
in countries with weaker average corporate governance, because the information costs they incur
would be disproportionately high. For highly educated people, instead, it is protable as they can
exploit their comparative advantage in acquiring information.
The upper part of the Table 8 (Section I) reports results when the regulatory measure adopted to
split in quartiles the destination countries is related to minority shareholder protection. Beyond the
three indexes used in Table 4, two additional measures of minority shareholder protection are used:
the Spamann anti-director rights index (Spamann (2010)) and the Anti-self dealing index (Djankov
et al. (2008)).
In the bottom part of Table 8 (Section II), destination countries are instead divided by quartiles
according to more general measures of legal protection such as, "legal enforcement", "rule of law",
and "law and order" (Economic Freedom Network).
The investment pattern described above systematically occurs only in Section I, when the invest-
ment opportunity set is split according to the degree of minority investor protection of the destination
country, for all alternative specications (panel a) to e)).
Section II of Table 8 shows instead that highly educated investors invest much less than other
investors in countries with low legal protection, and more in countries with stronger (general) legal
protection. The magnitude of the negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term is in fact larger for the
lowest quartile than for the two intermediate quartiles, and positive for the highest quartile. The
overall net e¤ect reveals that highly educated investors unequivocally appreciate a sounder regulatory
system, without any signal of non-monotonicity, that is peculiar of Section I.
We consider these ndings as corroborating our interpretation: if this mechanism worked for any
kind of regulation measure the doubt of a spurious relationship could naturally arise. Instead, the
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observed non-monotonic investment pattern of highly nancially literate investors is strictly related
to the measure on minority shareholder rightsprotection, which is the precisely the measure we
expect to drive the investment choice of equity portfolio investors.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of nancial education on international equity portfolio diversi-
cation.
We nd that higher investor nancial education fosters international diversication, and that its
role is particularly pronounced where information problems and monitoring costs are likely to be
more severe, that is, in countries where protection of minority shareholdersrights is weaker.
Poor investor protection exacerbates the distance-aversion of foreign investors, thus deterring
inward investment. This barrier can be particularly relevant for less educated investors who indeed
discard investment in less protective economies. If nancial education permits easier access to foreign
rmsspecic characteristics, then highly educated investors might be ready to diversify their interna-
tional portfolio in countries a¤ording lower minority shareholder protection, while investors endowed
with a lower nancial literacy would avoid those countries demanding excessively high information
costs.
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Table 1. Variable description (continued on next table)
This table reports denition and sources of all the variables adopted in the empirical analysis
Panel A: Dependent variable variable  label *
Equity portfolio share (country-pair) w lj
Market share (free-float adjusted) MS j
Panel B: Main Regressors
Financial knowledge
Financial education finlit l
Economic literacy eclit l
Finance skills finskill l
Minority Shareholders Rights' Index
Antidirector rights index ADR j
Revised Antidirector Rights Index rev_ADR j
Strength of Investor Protection Index WorldBank j
Spamann Antidirector rights Index Spamann_ADR j
Anti-self-dealing Index Anti_SelfIndex j
Panel C: Control variables
Measures of legal protection
Legal enforcement
Law and order
Rule of law
Question asks respondents to evaluate, on a 0-10 scale, the statement: "Finance skills are readily
available". Source: Executive Opinion Survey (1999-2008), IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
(WCY).
Variable Definition
The  Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) released by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) provides equity portfolio investment assets by economy of non resident issuer. Since the CPIS
does not report domestic positions, it is necessary to retrieve the share of foreign assets (FS ) in order
to derive the bilateral foreign portfolio positions in the overall portfolio. FS=FA/(MCAP+FA-FL):
MCAP is the country's stock market capitalization, FA and FL are, respectively, the outstanding
foreign equity portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities drawn from the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) Database.
Fidora et al. (2007) and Sorensen et al. (2007) follow the same procedure dealing with the CPIS
dataset. Source: CPIS (IMF) and IFS (IMF)
The MSCI Investable Market Indexes (IMI) cover all investable large, mid and small cap securities
across the Developed, Emerging and Frontier Markets, targeting approximately 99% of each market's
free-float adjusted market capitalization. Source: MSCI
The variables financial education, economic literacy and finance skills we adopt in the paper are drawn
from the annual Executive Opinion Survey and are referred to in the WCY as Survey Data. The
Executive Opinion Survey is sent to executives in top and middle management in all of the economies
covered by the WCY (57 countries in the last issue). The sample of respondents covers a cross-section
of the business community in each economic sector: primary, manufacturing and services, based on
their contribution to the GDP of the economy. The survey respondents are nationals or expatriates,
located in local and foreign enterprises in a country and who, in general, have an international
dimension.  Source: Executive Opinion Survey, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY).
Question asks respondents to evaluate, on a 0-10 scale, the statement: "Education in finance does meet
the needs of the business economy". Source: Executive Opinion Survey (1999-2008), IMD World
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY).
Question asks respondents to evaluate, on a 0-10 scale, the statement: "Economic literacy among the
population is generally high". Source: Executive Opinion Survey (1995-2008), IMD World
Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY).
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Source: Economic Freedom Network
The index captures antidirector rights, following LLSV (1998). The antidirector rights (ADR) index
measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant
shareholders in the corporate decision making process. Source: LLSV(1998).
The index amends the original LLSV (1998) index (Djankov et al. (2008)). The revised index relies on
the same basic dimensions of corporate law, but defines them with more precision. Source: Djankov et
al. (2008).
The Strength of Investor Protection Index (0-10) is constructed as the average of the "extent of
disclosure index", "director liability index", and "shareholder suits index". Source: Doing Business
Database, World Bank.
Measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders.
Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on
legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure,
approval, and litigation, governing a specific self-dealing transaction. Source: Djankov et al. (2008)
This component is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business estimates for the time and money
required to collect a clear-cut debt.  Source: Economic Freedom Network
This component is based on the International Country Risk Guide Political Risk. The ‘law’ sub-
component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the ‘order’ sub-component
assesses popular observance of the law”. Source: Economic Freedom Network
The index is constructed as in LLSV (1998) but a reexamination of the legal data leads to corrections
for thirty-three out of forty-six countries analyzed. The correlation between corrected and original
values is 0.53. Source: Spamann (2010)
 : Since all regressors, except dummy variables, enter the analysis in relative terms, their label in the
tables is preceded by the prex "rel_".
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Table 1 (continued ). Variable description
Panel C: Control variables
Time-invariant country controls variable label *
Expropriation risk
Efficiency of judicial system
Time-varying country controls
Political stability and absence of violence
Control of corruption
Bilateral specific controls
Distance dist lj
Common Border dummy dum_border lj
Common Language dummy dum_lang lj
EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy) dum_EMU lj
Colony dummy dum_colony lj
Equal Legal Origin dummy dum_eq_leg_origin lj
GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) DifferencesGAAP lj
Other control variables
Exchange rate regime exch_rate_reg l
Economic development (GDP per capita) gdp_cap l
International capital mobility capital mobility
Common law_dummy
Total number of GAAP differences between investing country l  and destination country j .  Measure
based on the measure gaapdiff2 in Bae et al. (2009). Survey data (GAAP 2001 survey) are used to
identify commonly occurring differences in 21 accounting items across countries to determine which
GAAP differences. See Appendix of Bae et al. (2009) for a description of the GAAP 2001 survey.
Source: Bae et al. (2009).
The index is based on Annual Data IMF Classification of exchange rate regime (Coarse Classification)
and ranges from 1 to 4. Source: Ilzetzki et al. (2008).
GDP per capita (current US$) GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear
population. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts.
Index (0-10) measuring the restrictions countries impose on capital flows assigning a lower rating to
countries with more restrictions on foreign capital transactions.  Source: Economic Freedom Network.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the destination country has a "common law" legal origin (0 otherwise).
This variable is used as instrument for the index of investor protection in the destination country.
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country and the destination country share the same
legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (0 otherwise). The countries
included in our sample belong to four legal families: English, French, German, Scandinavian.
ICR's assessment of the risk of "outright confiscation" or "forced nationalization". Scale from zero to
10 with lower scores for higher risk. Source: LLSV (1998).
Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly
foreign firms" produced by Business International Corporation. Scale from zero to 10 with lower
scores for lower efficiency level. Source: LLSV (1998).
These variables are drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank).  The
aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of
a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. The original indexes are
reported in their standard normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with an average of 0.
Since our variables all enter in relative terms, to avoid the zero in the denominator, we re-scale the
range from 0 to 5 (approximately) with an average of 2.5.
This index measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This
index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Source: Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI, World Bank).
This index captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank).
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source (l) and
destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as weighted (by
market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in the regression is
the ratio of the distance l-j to the average distance.
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
border (0 otherwise).
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
language (0 otherwise)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are members of
the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency
dummy since included countries do not belong to any other currency union.
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a colonial
linkage (0 otherwise)
Variable Definition
 : Since all regressors, except dummy variables, enter the analysis in relative terms, their label in the
tables is preceded by the prex "rel_".
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: regressors
This table reports descriptive statistics of all regressors included in the analysis (with exception of
bilateral variables). The reported gures are, for time-varying variables, averages over the period 2001-
2008.
financial
education
economic
literacy
financial
skills
ADR
revised
ADR
World Bank
index
Spamann
ADR
Anti-self
dealing Index
rule of law
law and
order
legal
enforcement
capital
mobility
GDP per
capita
exchange
rate regime
control of
risk of
expropriation
efficiency
of the
judicial
system
regulatory
quality
control of
corruption
common
law
dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Argentina 4.771 4.106 6.277 4 2 5.0 3 0.342 1.852 4.402 5.016 4.604 5298 3 5.910 6.000 1.910 2.059 0
Australia 7.364 7.138 7.617 4 4 5.7 4 0.757 4.256 9.661 6.230 5.110 31636 4 9.270 10.000 4.126 4.479 1
Austria 6.530 6.233 7.495 2 3 5.0 4 0.213 4.380 10.000 6.620 6.527 35959 1 9.690 9.500 4.091 4.533 0
Belgium 6.839 5.844 7.127 0 3 7.0 2 0.544 3.787 8.333 5.650 7.461 34547 1 9.630 9.500 3.812 3.857 0
Brazil 5.131 3.116 6.239 3 5 5.3 5 0.274 2.112 3.559 4.763 5.362 4870 4 7.620 5.750 2.634 2.468 0
Canada 6.991 6.614 7.601 5 4 8.7 4 0.642 4.223 10.000 4.814 7.664 33435 4 9.670 9.250 4.070 4.503 1
Chile 6.686 5.308 7.698 5 4 6.3 5 0.625 3.760 8.333 5.109 7.599 7293 4 7.500 7.250 3.957 3.911 0
Czeck Republic* 5.143 5.026 5.295 na 4 5.0 na 0.333 3.302 8.333 3.538 6.200 12589 3 na na 3.575 2.817 0
Denmark 7.817 6.954 7.732 2 4 6.3 4 0.463 4.428 10.000 6.155 8.080 45580 1 9.670 10.000 4.294 4.966 0
Egypt § na na na 2 3 3.7 4 0.204 2.468 6.563 3.408 6.181 1415 3 6.300 6.500 2.092 1.969 0
Estonia* 6.560 5.803 5.425 na na 5.7 na na 3.414 6.667 6.057 7.398 10388 1 na na 3.847 3.340 0
Finland 7.903 7.319 7.609 3 4 5.7 4 0.457 4.435 10.000 7.823 6.637 36528 1 9.670 10.000 4.228 4.979 0
France 5.992 4.314 7.017 3 4 5.3 5 0.379 3.893 8.333 6.913 7.264 32562 1 9.650 8.000 3.670 3.863 0
Germany 5.549 5.156 6.965 1 4 5.0 4 0.282 4.167 8.333 6.595 7.223 32861 1 9.900 9.000 4.024 4.350 0
Greece 5.284 4.708 6.074 2 2 5.3 3 0.217 3.320 6.303 4.125 6.371 20754 1 7.120 7.000 3.397 2.896 0
Hong Kong 6.780 6.714 7.763 5 5 9.0 4 0.963 3.908 7.943 7.625 8.737 26957 1 8.290 10.000 4.411 4.320 1
Hungary* 6.009 4.844 6.449 na 2 4.3 na 0.181 3.395 6.667 7.094 7.131 10131 1 na na 3.671 3.079 0
India 6.445 4.518 7.470 5 5 6.3 4 0.579 2.615 6.667 2.594 3.350 722 3 7.750 8.000 2.200 2.101 1
Indonesia 4.232 3.497 4.651 2 4 6.0 na 0.653 1.717 4.305 1.169 4.206 1339 3 7.160 2.500 2.026 1.664 0
Ireland§ 7.188 6.939 7.587 4 5 8.3 4 0.789 4.099 10.000 4.949 8.568 45641 1 9.670 8.750 4.247 4.054 1
Israel 7.239 6.575 7.685 3 4 8.3 4 0.725 3.392 8.333 3.463 8.035 20430 4 8.250 10.000 3.506 3.471 1
Italy 4.043 3.630 5.315 1 2 6.0 4 0.421 3.052 7.205 3.183 6.998 29241 1 9.350 6.750 3.459 2.947 0
Japan 4.560 6.341 5.531 4 5 7.0 5 0.499 3.763 8.333 6.372 6.513 34504 4 9.670 10.000 3.531 3.692 0
Malaysia 6.402 6.055 6.739 4 5 8.7 4 0.950 2.996 5.972 4.286 3.844 5554 3 7.950 9.000 3.025 2.777 1
Mexico 3.774 2.858 5.010 1 3 5.7 3 0.172 2.038 4.462 5.393 4.634 7826 4 7.290 6.000 2.868 2.262 0
Netherlands 7.156 6.574 7.370 2 3 4.7 4 0.203 4.237 10.000 5.108 8.602 38002 1 9.980 10.000 4.301 4.628 0
New Zealand 6.140 5.519 6.456 4 4 9.7 5 0.950 4.324 9.644 7.497 8.050 24073 4 9.690 10.000 4.200 4.850 1
Norway 7.137 6.186 6.935 4 4 6.7 4 0.421 4.408 10.000 7.555 6.514 62940 4 9.880 10.000 3.810 4.568 0
Pakistan§ na na na 5 4 6.3 5 0.408 1.646 5.000 3.554 3.458 684 3 5.620 5.000 1.844 1.640 1
Peru§ 3.750 2.475 6.150 3 4 7.0 5 0.450 1.836 5.000 4.501 7.990 2937 3 5.540 6.750 2.722 2.215 0
Philippines§ 5.770 4.760 7.236 3 4 4.3 5 0.215 2.029 3.698 3.457 3.399 1288 4 5.220 4.750 2.415 1.889 0
Poland* 4.215 3.517 4.885 na 2 6.0 na 0.288 2.981 7.031 4.271 4.130 8053 4 na na 3.265 2.789 0
Portugal 4.619 3.311 5.589 3 3 6.0 4 0.444 3.639 8.333 5.291 6.611 17553 1 8.900 5.500 3.645 3.585 0
Russia* 4.754 3.489 5.991 na 4 4.7 na 0.440 1.561 6.458 7.533 3.776 5586 3 na na 2.201 1.635 0
Singapore 7.549 7.588 7.694 4 5 9.3 4 1.000 4.091 8.750 8.301 7.521 28048 3 9.300 10.000 4.373 4.777 1
South Africa 4.009 2.421 4.501 5 5 8.0 5 0.813 2.588 4.063 3.926 3.951 4458 4 6.880 6.000 3.111 2.902 1
South Korea 4.914 5.850 5.485 2 5 6.0 6 0.469 3.389 7.917 8.105 4.559 16134 4 8.310 6.000 3.270 2.913 0
Spain 4.880 3.894 6.131 4 5 5.0 6 0.374 3.685 8.082 5.538 6.253 24781 1 9.520 6.250 3.770 3.732 0
Sweden 7.238 6.637 7.628 3 4 6.3 4 0.333 4.351 10.000 4.735 6.329 39668 4 9.400 10.000 4.061 4.727 0
Switzerland 7.109 6.795 7.868 2 3 3.0 3 0.267 4.377 8.333 5.991 7.093 50750 4 9.980 10.000 4.160 4.626 0
Taiwan§ 6.071 6.309 6.636 3 3 6.3 5 0.565 3.357 7.587 5.546 7.153 na na 9.120 6.750 3.544 3.172 0
Thailand 5.037 4.324 5.709 2 4 7.7 4 0.813 2.629 5.313 6.062 3.872 2719 3 7.420 3.250 2.796 2.256 1
Turkey 5.920 4.447 6.863 2 3 6.3 4 0.429 2.556 7.396 6.157 4.415 6414 4 7.000 4.000 2.713 2.338 0
United Kingdom 4.995 4.515 6.420 5 5 8.0 5 0.950 4.153 9.540 6.037 8.552 35970 4 9.710 10.000 4.261 4.433 1
United States 6.552 5.928 7.740 5 3 8.3 2 0.654 4.037 8.437 7.329 7.174 41437 4 9.980 10.000 4.096 4.110 1
Venezuela 3.971 2.352 5.073 1 1 2.3 2 0.092 1.207 3.646 3.966 4.897 6019 1 6.890 6.500 1.461 1.564 0
mean 5.765 5.072 6.420 3.000 3.398 5.990 3.978 0.460 3.058 7.002 5.203 6.013 18032.190 2.484 8.050 7.667 3.187 3.118 0.295
median 5.806 5.171 6.506 3 3.5 6.0 4 0.429 3.250 6.667 5.109 6.175 10293.910 3 8.250 7.250 3.351 2.975 0
max 8.603 8.162 8.500 5 5 9.7 6 1.000 4.500 10.000 8.479 9.573 112028.500 4 9.980 10.000 4.620 5.086 1
min 2.154 1.614 2.948 0 1 2.3 2 0.075 0.715 0.833 1.169 0.769 354.631 1 5.220 2.500 0.290 1.142 0
st.dev. 1.283 1.483 1.151 1.294 1.138 1.601 0.989 0.243 1.022 2.246 1.570 1.864 18799.180 1.300 1.572 2.030 0.912 1.109 0.456
Regressors
Notes:
§: economies included as destination but not as investing countries.
*: economies included as investing but not as destination countries.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: dependent variable and nancial education
This table reports descriptive statistics on the dependent variable and on nancial education, country
by country.
market share country j
(MSj)
scaled foreign share
(wj/MSj)
mean (%) st.dev.(%) mean (%) mean mean st.dev.
Argentina 0.014 0.024 0.045 0.318 4.771 0.613
Australia 0.594 1.820 2.175 0.273 7.364 0.462
Austria 0.271 0.539 0.152 1.780 6.530 0.487
Belgium 0.269 0.577 0.461 0.584 6.839 0.313
Brazil 0.197 0.264 0.761 0.259 5.131 0.499
Canada 0.196 0.297 2.889 0.068 6.991 0.486
Chile 0.008 0.012 0.105 0.080 6.686 0.592
Czeck Republic* 0.096 0.236 0.070 1.373 5.143 0.500
Denmark 0.113 0.205 0.335 0.339 7.817 0.299
Egypt § 0.006 0.006 0.051 0.112 na na
Estonia* 0.005 0.009 na na 6.560 0.235
Finland 0.358 0.531 0.700 0.512 7.903 0.463
France 1.417 1.755 4.136 0.343 5.992 0.682
Germany 1.329 2.041 3.161 0.421 5.549 0.300
Greece 0.068 0.066 0.215 0.315 5.284 0.307
Hong Kong 0.385 0.875 0.791 0.487 6.780 0.517
Hungary* 0.086 0.186 0.080 1.082 6.009 0.728
India 0.154 0.342 0.436 0.354 6.445 0.598
Indonesia 0.062 0.164 0.114 0.548 4.232 0.290
Ireland§ 0.915 0.915 0.324 2.822 7.188 0.269
Israel 0.033 0.039 0.216 0.154 7.239 0.387
Italy 0.481 0.556 1.639 0.294 4.043 0.308
Japan 1.132 1.246 9.234 0.123 4.560 0.546
Malaysia 0.195 0.739 0.236 0.828 6.402 0.647
Mexico 0.078 0.090 0.436 0.178 3.774 0.544
Netherlands 0.775 0.846 1.854 0.418 7.156 0.293
New Zealand 0.012 0.014 0.071 0.168 6.140 0.274
Norway 0.119 0.198 0.283 0.420 7.137 0.445
Pakistan§ 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.101 na na
Perù§ 0.007 0.017 0.040 0.168 3.750 na
Philippines§ 0.020 0.054 0.036 0.560 5.770 0.478
Poland* 0.163 0.398 0.111 1.459 4.215 0.607
Portugal 0.048 0.060 0.144 0.334 4.619 0.465
Russia* 0.277 0.434 0.440 0.628 4.754 0.616
Singapore 0.120 0.145 0.385 0.312 7.549 0.262
South Africa 0.085 0.102 0.671 0.127 4.009 0.670
South Korea 0.286 0.415 1.101 0.260 4.914 0.306
Spain 0.700 1.560 1.625 0.431 4.880 0.630
Sweden 0.535 1.349 0.958 0.558 7.238 0.165
Switzerland 0.718 0.856 3.074 0.233 7.109 0.432
Taiwan§ 0.170 0.245 0.842 0.202 6.071 0.264
Thailand 0.103 0.293 0.125 0.829 5.037 0.530
Turkey 0.049 0.052 0.119 0.416 5.920 0.435
United Kingdom 2.457 2.407 9.944 0.247 4.995 0.407
United States 5.121 5.972 48.665 0.105 6.552 0.418
Venezuela 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.416 3.971 0.643
by destination country by investing country
portfolio share in country j
(wj)
financial education
(finlit l)
Notes:
§: economies included as destination but not as investing countries.
*: economies included as investing but not as destination countries.
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Table 4. Financial education and investor protection
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent
variable is the scaled foreign portfolio, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (wlj /MSj), where
the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. Each regressor X (dummy
variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. Further details on the variables
are provided in Table 1. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (8a) (8b)
rel_finlit l 0.511 *** 0.500 *** 0.019 *** 0.437 *** 0.200 *** 0.186 *** 0.206 *** 0.204 *** 0.193 *** 0.195 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.038 )
rel_ADR j 0.013 * 0.016 ** 0.040 ***
( 0.007 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 )
rel_rev_ADR j 0.153 ***
( 0.019 )
rel_WorldBank j 0.120 ***
( 0.017 )
dist lj -0.087 *** -0.079 *** -0.076 *** -0.089 *** -0.098 *** -0.096 *** -0.100 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 )
dum_lang lj 0.086 *** 0.071 *** 0.072 *** 0.059 *** 0.072 *** 0.061 *** 0.063 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
dum_border lj 0.501 *** 0.524 *** 0.531 *** 0.534 *** 0.533 *** 0.536 *** 0.513 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )
dum_EMU lj 0.581 *** 0.513 *** 0.519 *** 0.493 *** 0.482 *** 0.496 *** 0.496 ***
( 0.044 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 )
dum_eq_leg_origin lj 0.002 0.042 *** 0.041 *** 0.063 *** 0.061 *** 0.075 *** 0.067 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
dum_colony lj 0.118 *** 0.066 *** 0.049 *** 0.076 *** 0.077 *** 0.079 *** 0.091 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 )
exch_rate_reg l 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 )
rel_gdp_cap l 0.042 *** 0.042 *** 0.045 *** 0.044 *** 0.045 *** 0.045 ***
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 )
rel_cap_mob l 0.015 0.028 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.013
( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.037 )
rel_cap_mob j 0.132 *** 0.125 *** 0.020 0.076 *** 0.077 *** 0.039 **
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.018 )
crisis_dummy -0.003 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.017
( 0.081 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
rel_finlit l • crisis_dummy 0.026
( 0.081 )
rel_gdp_cap j 0.024 *** 0.046 *** 0.057 *** 0.054 ***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.005 )
rel_GAAP lj -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
time dummies no yes no no no no no no no no
fixed effect country l no no yes no no no no no no no
country j's controls (time invariant ) no no no no no no no yes yes yes
#obs 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965
Adj-R 2 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.27
Financial education and investor protection
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Table 5. Interaction between nancial education and investor protection
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent
variable is the scaled foreign portfolio, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (wlj /MSj), where
the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. Each regressor X (dummy
variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. Further details on the variables
are provided in Table 1. Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (1a) (1b) (2) (2a) (2b) (3) (3a) (3b)
rel_finlit l 0.331 *** 0.102 *** 0.056 ***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.010 )
rel_ADR j 0.157 *** 0.059 *** 0.070 *** 0.083 *** 0.054 *** 0.066 *** 0.160 *** 0.056 *** 0.067 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 )
(rel_finlit l )(rel_ADR j ) -0.123 *** -0.052 *** -0.024 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.006 )
rel_eclit l 0.068 0.019 0.021 *
( 0.047 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.011 )
(rel_eclit l )(rel_ADRj) -0.048 * -0.032 ** -0.018 ***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.006 )
rel_finskill l 0.223 *** 0.093 *** 0.041 ***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.010 )
(rel_finskill l )(rel_ADRj) -0.129 *** -0.045 *** -0.022 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.006 )
dist lj -0.097 *** -0.098 *** -0.096 *** -0.097 *** -0.096 *** -0.097 *** -0.096 *** -0.097 *** -0.097 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
dum_lang lj 0.076 *** 0.081 *** 0.079 *** 0.082 *** 0.083 *** 0.085 *** 0.076 *** 0.074 *** 0.075 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
dum_border lj 0.529 *** 0.542 *** 0.536 *** 0.520 *** 0.540 *** 0.520 *** 0.556 *** 0.553 *** 0.556 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )
dum_EMU lj 0.482 *** 0.465 *** 0.478 *** 0.465 *** 0.443 *** 0.461 *** 0.466 *** 0.463 *** 0.468 ***
( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.041 )
dum_eq_leg_origin lj 0.065 *** 0.066 *** 0.064 *** 0.070 *** 0.069 *** 0.068 *** 0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.065 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
dum_colony lj 0.077 *** 0.071 *** 0.072 *** 0.077 *** 0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.080 *** 0.076 *** 0.078 ***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 )
crisis_dummy 0.075 *** 0.074 *** 0.075 *** 0.063 *** 0.075 *** 0.064 *** 0.071 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
GAAP lj , exch_rate_reg l & rel_gdp_cap l yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country j's controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
capital mobility yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
#obs 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965
Adj-R 2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28
Interaction between financial education and investor protection
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Table 6. Robustness
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent
variable is the scaled foreign portfolio, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (wlj /MSj),
where the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. In column (4), the
dependent variable is the bias measure proposed by Cooper et al. (2013) (see footnote 23, for details on
the construction of the bias measure). Each regressor X (dummy variables excluded) is expressed as the
ratio of X to its world average. Further details on the variables are provided in Table 1. Two-way clustered
(investing country and time) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
rel_finlit l 0.338 *** 0.362 *** 0.211 *** 0.006 0.201 *** 0.204 *** 0.337 *** 0.329 *** 0.457 ***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.082 )
rel_ADR j 0.169 *** 0.155 *** 0.005 0.040 *** 0.032 *** 0.162 *** 0.120 *** 0.216 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.062 )
(rel_finlit l )(rel_ADR j ) -0.130 *** -0.115 *** -0.011 ** -0.136 *** -0.164 *** -0.142 **
( 0.035 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.058 )
(rel_ADR l -rel_ADR j ) 0.035
( 0.040 )
(rel_finlit l )(rel_ADRl-rel_ADRj) -0.013
( 0.041 )
dist lj -0.099 *** -0.094 *** -0.089 *** -0.014 *** -0.098 *** -0.098 *** -0.097 *** -0.088 *** -0.135 ***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.015 )
dum_lang lj 0.079 *** 0.095 *** 0.082 *** 0.001 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.075 *** 0.068 *** -0.043
( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.033 )
dum_border lj 0.525 *** 0.496 *** 0.478 *** 0.044 *** 0.533 *** 0.533 *** 0.529 *** 0.646 *** 0.747 ***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.035 )
dum_EMU lj 0.484 *** 0.467 *** 0.486 *** 0.021 *** 0.482 *** 0.482 *** 0.483 *** 0.241 *** 0.481 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.044 )
dum_eq_leg_origin lj 0.062 *** 0.037 *** 0.035 *** 0.010 *** 0.061 *** 0.060 *** 0.065 *** 0.088 *** 0.129 ***
( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.019 )
dum_colony lj 0.076 *** 0.058 *** 0.071 *** 0.003 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.080 *** 0.172 ***
( 0.017 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.035 )
dum_crisis 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.000 0.001 -0.026 -0.026 -0.013 0.029
( 0.016 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.029 )
rel_finlit l • dum_crisis 0.018
( 0.081 )
rel_ADR j • dum_crisis 0.043 **
( 0.018 )
(rel_finlit l )(rel_ADR j ) • dum_crisis 0.043 **
( 0.019 )*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
bilateral factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
GAAP lj , exch_rate_reg l & rel_gdp_cap l yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country j's controls (time invariant) no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country j's controls (time varying) yes no no no no no no no no
country l's controls & ADR l no yes no no no no no no no
difference in country controls no no yes no no no no no no
capital mobility yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
#obs 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 9965 8611 4918
Adj-R 2 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.36
Robustness
crisis samplealternative specifications
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Table 7. Endogeneity issues
In this table we apply a GMM approach to address endogeneity.32 In column (1) we instrument the
finlitl variable with its lagged value. In column (2) we instrument the ADR index with destination
countrys legal origin, in column (3) we instrument both variables. In column (4) we add a further lagged
value for finlitl in order to perform a test of overidentifying restrictions (standard statistics to test the
validity of instruments are reported at the bottom of column (4)) ***, **, and * indicate signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rel_finlit l 0.138 *** 0.562 *** 0.635 *** 0.629 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.081 )
rel_ADR j 0.192 *** 1.328 *** 1.418 *** 1.402 ***
( 0.062 ) ( 0.179 ) ( 0.185 ) ( 0.183 )
(rel_finlit l )(rel_ADR j ) -0.051 * -0.474 *** -0.528 *** -0.520 ***
( 0.029 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.071 )
dist lj -0.268 *** -0.298 *** -0.300 *** -0.301 ***
( 0.025 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 )
dum_lang lj 0.082 0.008 0.003 0.000
( 0.088 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.092 )
dum_border lj 0.893 *** 0.892 *** 0.883 *** 0.887 ***
( 0.143 ) ( 0.145 ) ( 0.144 ) ( 0.144 )
dum_EMU lj 0.536 *** 0.623 *** 0.629 *** 0.611 ***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.086 )
dum_eq_leg_origin lj 0.155 *** 0.256 *** 0.265 *** 0.264 ***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 )
dum_colony lj 0.392 ** 0.293 * 0.303 * 0.300 *
( 0.156 ) ( 0.157 ) ( 0.158 ) ( 0.158 )
dum_crisis 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.007
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 )*** *** *** ***
GAAP lj , exch_rate_reg l & rel_gdp_cap l yes yes yes yes
country l's controls yes yes yes yes
country j's controls yes yes yes yes
capital mobility yes yes yes yes
#obs 9930 9965 9930 9890
Adj-R 2 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05
Instrumented endogenous regressors:
Test of instruments' validity:
 -  F-test (p-value):
             - financial literacy 0.00 -
             - investor protection - 0.00
 - Hansen-J statistic (p-value): - -
0.00 0.00
0.27
GMM regression
- financial literacy
- investor protectioninvestor protection
exactly identified model
financial literacy
-
Instruments:
- financial literacy (-1)
- financial literacy (-2)
- common law dummy
- financial literacy
- investor protection
overidentified model
- financial literacy (-1)
-common law dummy
financial literacy (-1) common law dummy
32We implement a GMM regression, robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.
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Table 8. Interpretation of ndings
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in Section 3.1 in the text. The dependent
variable is the scaled foreign portfolio, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, (wlj /MSj), where
the subscript lj represents the couple investing country l -destination country j. Each regressor X (dummy
variables excluded) is expressed as the ratio of X to its world average. Further details on the variables are
provided in Table 1. This table represents the investment patterns of investors endowed with a top-quartile
nancial education (rel_finlitljq4) in destination countries belonging to the k  th quartile of the di¤erent
regulatory measures distribution (Qk). Two-way clustered (investing country and time) standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
 I. measures of minority shareholder protection
a) rel_finlit l | q4 0.106 *** 0.085 *** 0.134 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.021 )
rel_ADR j | Qk -0.050 *** 0.042 *** -0.003
( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rel_ADR j | Qk ) 0.019 0.067 *** -0.129 ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.021 )
b) rel_finlit l | q4 0.118 *** 0.076 *** 0.153 ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.025 )
rel_rev_ADR j | Qk -0.025 ** -0.074 *** 0.085 ***
( 0.012 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.010 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rel_rev_ADR j | Qk ) -0.025 0.107 *** -0.075 ***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.023 )
c) rel_finlit l | q4 0.115 *** 0.067 *** 0.139 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 )
rel_World Bank j | Qk -0.002 -0.067 *** 0.083 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rel_World Bank j | Qk ) -0.048 ** 0.084 *** -0.073 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.023 )
d) rel_finlit l | q4 0.108 *** 0.041 ** 0.136 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.021 )
rel_Spamann ADR j | Qk -0.006 0.049 *** -0.032 ***
( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.007 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rel_Spamann ADR j | Qk ) -0.065 ** 0.132 *** -0.101 ***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.017 )
e) rel_finlit l | q4 0.116 *** 0.070 *** 0.138 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 )
rel_Anti_Self Index j | Qk -0.007 -0.070 *** 0.096 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.011 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rel_Anti_Self Index j | Qk ) -0.024 0.088 *** -0.075 ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.027 )
II. measures of general legal protection
a) rel_finlit l | q4 0.145 *** 0.156 *** 0.093 ***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.020 )
leg_enf j | Qk 0.023 *** 0.040 *** -0.050 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.009 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(leg_enf j | Qk ) -0.177 *** -0.103 *** 0.062 ***
( 0.022 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.020 )
b) rel_finlit l | q4 0.120 *** 0.146 *** 0.005
( 0.019 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.023 )
rule_law j | Qk 0.013 0.054 *** -0.071 ***
( 0.014 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(rule_law j | Qk ) -0.177 *** -0.130 *** 0.162 ***
( 0.037 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.025 )
c) rel_finlit l | q4 0.145 *** 0.128 *** 0.027
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 )
law_order j | Qk 0.005 -0.002 0.007
( 0.010 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.010 )
(rel_finlit l | q4 )(law_order j | Qk ) -0.151 *** -0.067 *** 0.160 ***
( 0.025 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.026 )
Investment patterns of highly literate investors
regression by quartiles of regulatory measure (Qk)
Q1 Q2&Q3 Q4
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